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SVM Project List SEPTA | |
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5.18 SAFETY AND SECURITY5.18.1 REGULATORY SETTING AND METHODOLOGYFederal regulations exist that are applicable to rail operations such as those proposed for SVM. Jurisdiction depends on whether the rail system is part of the national railway system or not. In general, operation of the commuter rail components of Alternatives 1D, 1E, and 2D as well as Alternative 6 would fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Railroad Administration.The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) added Section 28 to the Federal Transit Act requiring FTA to issue a Rule creating a state-managed oversight program for rail transit safety and security. That rule, codified at 49 CFR Part 659, also became known as the State Safety Oversight Rule. Alternatives 5E and 5ET, as well as the light rail components of Alternatives 1D and 1E would be subject to state safety oversight. In Pennsylvania, PennDOT administers the safety oversight program. If light rail and freight share the same grade crossing, even with separate tracks, FRA regulations will need to be met. Safety records related to at-grade crossing train/vehicle accidents were obtained from Federal Railroad Administration and SEPTA files. Records on accidents including pedestrians for the R6 right-of-way and security incidents were obtained from SEPTA files. 5.18.2 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENTSafety and security issues include accidents involving trains and people and motor vehicles and crime against passengers or passengers' property. The SVM build alternatives will use and/or widen approximately 67 miles of active railroad alignment and add five miles of new alignment that traverse urban, suburban, town, and rural areas between Philadelphia and Wyomissing. The type, maximum speed, and approximate number of trains each day traversing the alignment are listed in Table 5.18-1. Much of the rural area is in the process of population growth and changing more to suburban.There are a total of 34 existing at-grade vehicular crossings and 3 proposed (new) (see Table 4.2-1 for complete listing and accident history) on the active alignment segments. The at-grade crossings include one or more safety measures for pedestrian and vehicular safety. These measures include flashing lights, ringing bells, and crossing gates. SEPTA trains and Norfolk-Southern locomotives are equipped with horns used to alert motorists and pedestrians of an approaching train. No trespassing signs are posted along the alignments. Security fencing is generally not present along the alignments. Six of the nine injury producing accidents along SEPTA's R6 Line since 1975 were at two crossings (River Road and Nixon Street). Safety gates were put in place at these crossing in 1997. Other improvements were made at the Conshohocken area crossings in the early 1990s. There has been one fatal vehicular-train accident and two other injury-producing accidents at SEPTA R6 grade crossings since 1995. Also since 1995, two pedestrians (one a trespasser) have been struck by trains. SEPTA's passenger stations on the Norristown and Cynwyd lines are located in a mix of residential and commercial areas in both urban and suburban settings. Outside of the three Center City stations, only the Norristown station is staffed by a stationmaster, and only during the commuter day. Station area security is coordinated between SEPTA Police and the police forces of the local jurisdictions. One or more conductors, as well as an engineer, staff commuter trains. Other rail-based elements of SEPTA's transportation system - Broad Street Subway, Market-Frankford Line, and the Route 100 Line - have only a single operator. SEPTA maintains a 249 member police force. Average 1999 weekday round trips on the two segments of the R6 averaged about 6400 passengers. During 1999, weekday passenger round trips on the Route 100 Line averaged about 3,800. Statistics on the number of crimes against passengers or passenger property reported to SEPTA police for all R6 trains and stations (not including the three Center City stations) in 1999 included: four crimes against passengers - one assault, one robbery on a train, and two robberies at station areas - and seven crimes against passenger property - four theft/vandalism of parked automobiles and three stolen autos. There was one reported crime (a robbery with handgun) on the Route 100 light rail system (not including the 69th Street terminal that serves many SEPTA lines and the Norristown Transportation Center [data included with R6 statistics]) for 1999. 5.18.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES AND MITIGATION5.18.3.1 NO-BUILD ALTERNATIVEThe number of vehicle and pedestrian related accidents would increase over time in proportion to the increase in the amount of traffic on the roads. This would increase the demand on police and emergency services. It is not anticipated that additional police and emergency personnel would have to be hired to handle the increase in vehicle and pedestrian accidents.5.18.3.2 TSM ALTERNATIVEExtending the R6 Norristown line to Port Kennedy would not increase the number of trains per day or the number of grade crossings. During operations, a limited amount of police protection would be required to assure safety and security at park and ride bus facilities and at the Port Kennedy Station and at the other park-and-ride facilities. A positive impact of the TSM Alternative would result from the potential for a reduction in the number of vehicle accidents and congestion attributed to the reduction in the number of cars on the roads as the new transit passengers begin to use the extended commuter railroad and express bus system.5.18.3.3 BUILD ALTERNATIVESSafetyThe project will result in three new at-grade crossings (East Pikeland [1] and Phoenixville [2]). The number of trains per day passing at-grade crossings will increase substantially (up to 104 passenger trains per day west of Port Kennedy, up to 210 trains per day between Port Kennedy and Ivy Ridge, and up to 148 trains per day east of Ivy Ridge via East Falls.) Maximum train speeds will be 79 miles per hour. Passengers using the SVM system will increase substantially in comparison to current R6 and Route 100 ridership. At-grade crossing accidents between trains and vehicles or pedestrians would potentially increase due to the greater number of trains and faster speeds (in some locations.) Evaluation of safety issues and control systems for all at-grade crossings would be performed as part of Preliminary Engineering. Safety system upgrades would include installation of gates, upgraded light flashing systems, improved signage, other systems, and sight-line improvements. All of these, together with education, would mitigate against an increase in accidents. Alternative 5E includes street running in Center City Philadelphia. Modified traffic controls would be used so as to reduce the potential for metro/vehicle accidents. Despite the active railroad use of the alignment and the distance of the alignment from high-density development for much of its length, pedestrians undoubtedly cross or walk along the alignment despite the presence of no trespassing signs. The greater number of trains, their higher speeds than the current freight and commuter trains, and their generation of less noise than current rail vehicles, increase the potential for accidents with trespassing pedestrians. Potential mitigation measures would include educational programs in the schools (equivalent to existing SEPTA program), other community based educational programs, and fencing along certain portions of the right-of-way. All alternatives include passenger service running side by side with freight trains. Design and operations planning would have to be performed in conjunction with the freight railroad to design safety systems and procedures to accommodate both systems. At all station locations where there is freight train traffic, patrons would be physically prohibited from crossing freight tracks. The potential exists for patrons to slip on the platform and possibly fall onto the tracks. To help assure public safety, warning lights, tactile strips and/or signals will be provided at all stations to help a patron avoid slipping off the platform; the platform edge will be made of a non-slip material. The extent of physical barriers is part of an ongoing exploration of pedestrian safety. The applicable National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Guidelines for Life-Safety and Fixed Guideway Transit Systems (NFPA codes 101 and 103, respectively) would be followed. The vehicle construction materials used would be nonflammable to the extent possible to minimize the chances for a fire to start or spread. SVM would host informational meetings and provide training seminars for local emergency medical teams, fire departments and emergency response teams. These seminars would provide information regarding vehicle operations and the potential emergency issues associated with the SVM operation. Alternatives 5E, 5ET, and 6 require a single operator. Alternatives 1D, 1E, and 2D would require an engineer and one or more conductors. Passenger safety, without the assistance of a conductor, would be accommodated by easy access vehicle entryways. An increase in the number of automobiles and other vehicles turning off of or onto local streets and pedestrians crossing streets at station locations may result in an increase in accidents to motorists and pedestrians at these locations. The potential reduction in the number of vehicle accidents attributed to the reduction in the number of cars on the roads, correlating to the new transit passengers, will be a positive impact of the build alternatives. Security The greater area that would be served by public transit and the associated increase in ridership and use of transit system parking lots would increase the potential for transit-related criminal activity. The security impacts for the build alternatives would include an increase in the amount of security and police protection required during construction and operation activities along the alignment, at the maintenance facility and at the station locations. Life-safety standards would be incorporated into the design of the stations. This would include measures such as fencing to protect patrons from the track areas, lighting as a deterrent to crime and to assure good visibility in the station and parking areas, and the use of transparent materials in the construction of walls and structures, where applicable, to reduce areas of concealment for criminals and provide better sight-lines. In addition to these measures, closed-circuit television cameras would be located in various areas around the stations, emergency telephone devices would be available at the stations to allow patrons to communicate to a security person and a public address system would be installed at the stations. SVM security forces would be responsible for public security at the park-and-ride stations. The security force would establish coordination linkages with local police departments and work with them to minimize crime and in the event of any crimes. The presence of the SVM security force would serve to minimize the amount of crime at the stations, and it is not anticipated that additional staffing at the local police departments would be required. Light rail and Alternative 6 vehicles are anticipated to have a single crewmember, unlike commuter rail, which has an engineer, and one or more conductors. Security would be supplemented by plainclothes transit police, security cameras, emergency alarms, roving ticket checkers, and other means. SVM security would also coordinate planning with local fire and emergency medical response services. Fire protection and medical response drills are required from time to time on all transit systems. Fire protection may be required to respond to fires in vehicles, stations, at the maintenance facility and at substations. Emergency medical services could be required in the case of illness of a passenger or crewmember, if an accident occurred at one of the stations, on the track, at a street crossing, or on a vehicle. It is not anticipated that the SVM would require additional staffing of local fire and emergency medical services. Before startup of the system, informational meetings and training seminars will be provided for citizens, agencies, businesses and schools affected by the new system. These seminars will provide information regarding operations, potential safety and security issues and agency responsibilities.
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